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RESIDENTIAL PICKETING OF SLUM LANDLORDS
In Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization to Rejuvenate Tenant
Housing,' the defendant organization picketed outside the plaintiff's
residence to protest plaintiff's practice of renting houses in the low-
income districts of Philadelphia without maintaining a rental office
there, as well as his failure to provide vital services. The plaintiff had
conducted his business using the assumed name of "Ben Reed."'2 He
required tenants to send their rent payments and complaints by mail
to a post office box in Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania.3 After a hearing,
the trial court granted a preliminary injunction to restrain the picket-
ing. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, stating:
When a landlord conducts his business in a manner to avoid
detection and not at a regular place of business, informational
picketing may not be enjoined Eor the sole reason that tenants
and others resorted to picketing the landlord's home.4
The court thus held that tenants' peaceful and orderly picketing
could not be enjoined solely because the situs of the picketing was the
landowner's home. The court seemingly followed the majority of
decisions in cases on this issue.
Picketing5 has been the source of much litigation over the years, but
there are few cases directly in point with the one under discussion.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Thornhill v. Alabama,6 which
established picketing as a form of constitutionally protected free
speech, there was at least one New York case similar to Hibbs, although
the court reached a contrary result.7 Since 1960 there have been two
1. 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622 (1969).
2. The defendants apparently did not know plaintiffs real name or where he
lived for an extended period of time. There is some indication that the defendants
did not learn this information until they had decided to bring legal action against
him. See Brief for Appellants at 1.
3. Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania is located in Montgomery County, adjoining
the City of Philadelphia.
4. 433 Pa. at 580, 252 A.2d at 624.
5. As used in this paper, "picketing" refers to any form of the activity, while
"residential picketing" is used to connote only the picketing of a person's home.
6. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
7. People v. Kopezak, 153 Misc. 187, 274 N.Y.S. 629 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1934),
afd, 266 N.Y. 565, 195 N.E. 202 (1935). Tenants who picketed in front of
their dwelling were charged with disorderly conduct and convicted. On appeal,
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other New York cases which involved similar problems, the court in
the most recent of these reaching basically the same result as the Hibbs
court. 8
In Hibbs, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently followed the
policy it had established in 1621, Inc. v. Wilson.9 In that case neigh-
borhood residents picketed the plaintiff's taproom protesting its open-
ing and operation. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction which
was denied in the lower court, and the supreme court of the state
affirmed the order denying injunctive relief. In reaching its decision,
the court held that the objective or purpose of the picketing is deter-
minative and that the appellees' purpose "was to protect against an
admitted nuisance in fact." 10 The court concluded that there was a
legitimate purpose for the picketing and, therefore, the activity could
not be enjoined."l
The court in Hibbs continued the Wilson policy of looking only to
the picketers' objectives to determine whether an injunction should
issue in cases where the picketing is done in an orderly and peaceful
the Court of Special Sessions affirmed, indicating that the tenants should have
gone to the municipal authorities charged with protecting residents from poor
housing conditions. Picketing was not constitutionally protected at the time this
case was decided. It is doubtful that the same result would obtain today for two
reasons. First, the disorderly conduct ordinance involved was apparently quite
broad, leaving a great deal of discretion to the individual police officer, and thus
it probably would not survive the test of constitutionality today. Secondly, if the
ordinance did not make the picketing unlawful, the fact that it was peaceful and
orderly and the fact that the tenants had legitimate complaints would cloak the
picketing with constitutional protection.
8. West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Dicta Realty Associates v. Shaw, 50 Misc. 2d 267, 270 N.Y.S.2d
342 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Lessee picketed in front of apartment complaining of ex-
cess noise, poor maintenance, and other conditions. Injunctive relief was denied,
the court, at 270, having found that the picketing was "conducted in an orderly
manner and ... there is no denial of the truth and accuracy of the placards nor
is a monetary loss established by reason of the picketing." The court seems to be
going in the back doqr here, finding that since the activity was not illegal, the
purpose or objective of the picketing is therefore legitimate and cannot be en-
joined.
9. 402 Pa. 94, 166 A.2d 271 (1960).
10. Id. at 108, 166 A.2d at 278.
11. The fact that the court found a nuisance in Wilson is not meaningful to
the Hibbs case. The important aspect of Wilson, with respect to the Hibbs de-
cision, is the test of legality used by the court, i.e., the legality of the objective or
purpose of the picketing, as well as whether it was peaceful and orderly.
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manner.1 2 In so doing, the court extended the policy to include resi-
dential picketing, at least in cases where there is no other means of
communication between the tenants and their landlord. The Hibbs
court cited only one case, Gregory v. City of Chicago,13 which it appar-
ently thought justified the extension.
In the Gregory case, comedian Dick Gregory led a group of demon-
strators to the home of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, where they
engaged in peaceful and orderly picketing of his home.14 A large group
of spectators gathered. When the onlookers became rowdy and boister-
ous, the police told the picketers to disperse. The demonstrators
refused to leave and were arrested for disorderly conduct. Gregory was
convicted in the lower court and the decision was affirmed in the
Illinois Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the decision, holding that the conduct was protected by the first
amendment. The important aspect of the case was that it did not dis-
tinguish between residential and non-residential picketing.15
The Hibbs court specifically refrained from laying down a blanket
rule permitting residential picketing, but this does not mean that it
will not do so in the future.0 Justice Roberts, in a short concurring
opinion, seemed to indicate that the court might consider laying down
such a blanket rule when he stated:
[T]he question of to what extent purely residential picketing
may be proscribed is not before us. Thus while the majority
opinion correctly holds that residential picketing is permissible
where no other alternative is available, it should not be read as
authority for the converse proposition, i.e., that residential pick-
12. The types of "purposes or objectives" that courts will accept as legal or
legitimate cannot be enumerated. It would seem, however, that if the picketing
is peaceful and orderly, a well-defined, constitutional need must be shown before
the picketing can be constitutionally restrained.
13. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
14. The basic reason for the picketing was to press claims for desegregation
of public schools.
15. The failure of the Court to distinguish between residential and non-resi-
dential picketing is the important aspect of the Gregory decision vis-a-vis Hibbs.
There are certainly other important details in the case, but they are not neces-
sarily related to the Hibbs decision.
16. The court stated that this was not a true case of residential picketing be-
cause there was no other place available where the appellants could effectively
communicate, and therefore the question of a blanket rule was not properly
before them. Perhaps another important reason why the court did not decide the
question was the fact that appellee did not submit a brief or participate in oral
argument. 433 Pa. at 580-81, 252 A.2d at 623.
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eting may be enjoined merely if another nonresidential picketing
situs can be effectively utilized.' 7
That picketing is not entitled to the same degree of constitutional
protection as pure speech, was demonstrated in Cox v. Louisiana's
when the Supreme Court stated:
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the
First and Fourteenth amendments afford the same kind of free-
dom to those who would communicate by conduct such as
patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as
these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure
speech.' 9
Picketing is thus open to government regulation.20 Apparently, resi-
dential picketing is not subject to any greater limitation or regulation
than other forms of picketing.21
Legislatures typically regulate activities such as picketing22 and com-
mentators have argued that residential picketing in particular should
be controlled.23 However, there are so few means of combating a
"slumlord's" business practices that there may be a real need for resi-
dential picketing. In the absence of legislation, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has taken the position that there is no distinction
between residential and non-residential picketing and that the same
test of legality is to be applied to each: the legitimacy and legality of
the picketers' objective or purpose. The decision is sound in that it
recognizes that many "slumlords" will remain away from a particular
jurisdiction where they rent slum housing so as to avoid hearing com-
plaints, to avoid being served with housing authority orders, and to
avoid detection generally. Apparently it is also a common practice for
17. Id. at 581, 252 A.2d at 624.
18. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
19. Id. at 555.
20. Governmental regulation must be embodied in a very narrowly drawn
statute. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
21. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969). At 112, the Court
stated: "Petitioners' conduct, if peaceful and orderly, falls well within the sphere
of conduct protected by the First Amendment."
22. Several states have enacted such legislation. The following is a list of
just a few: CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-120 (1958); HAWAIn RnV. LAWS
300-1 (1965); Wis. STAT. § 111.06(2) (a) (1963).
23. See Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw.
U.L. Rav. 177 (1966); Note, Picketing the Homes of Public Officials, 34 U.
CHL L. Ray. 106 (1966).
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individuals who rent slum housing permanently to stay outside the
jurisdiction of the courts enforcing the housing codes.24 Residential
picketing provides an effective means of publicizing these practices of
slum landlords.
Joseph M. Ellis
24. See Brief for Appellants at 2, Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization to
Rejuvenate Tenant Housing, 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622 (1969).
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